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Abstract 
 
In this paper the economic analysis of law is used to analyze the international regime 
with respect to the compensation provided to victims of oil pollution damage. It 
concerns more particularly the regime which came into being through the 
international maritime organization (IMO) which resulted in 
the Civil Liability Convention of 1969 and the Fund Convention of 1971. First the 
general lessons from the economic analysis of law are used to argue how optimal 
compensation for victims of oil pollution damage should be constructed. Than the 
contents and evolution of the international origine is briefly sketched. Finally the 
lessons from economic analysis are compared with the actual structure of the 
international regime. Specific attention is paid e.g. to the fact that a strict liability rule 
applies to tanker owners, to the limitation of liability, to the channelling of liability to 
the tanker owner and to the introduction of compulsory insurance. Some of the 
features of the international regime (suggest the introduction of a duty to seek 
financial coverage and the shift to strict liability) are judged in compliance with 
economic analysis. Other features (more particularly the limitation of liability and a 
channelling of liability to the tanker owner) do not seem to fit into the economic 
model. 
 
Keywords: Oil pollution, economic analysis, strict liability, compulsory insurance, 
channelling 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, almost all continents have suffered severe damage as a result of oil 
spills. The most known ones probably occurred in Europe. The names Torrey Canyon, 
Amoco Cadiz etc. still come to mind as major incidents that occurred in the 1960s and 
70s. The international legislator reacted soon after the Torrey Canyon incident with a 
Convention on the Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 and with an 
additional Fund Convention. The goals of these legal arrangements were to guarantee 
some compensation to victims of oil pollution incidents. A strict liability rule was 
imposed on the tanker owner and the liability was channeled to him, but strict limits 
on the liability applied. The new incident with Amoco Cadiz made clear that the then 
existing limits did not suffice to compensate the victims and additional institutional 
arrangements were proposed (in the form of amendments and protocols).  
 
Meanwhile in 1988, the US was also severely hit by the Exxon Valdez incident that 
led to severe damage in the State of Alaska. The US, that had not joined the 
international oil pollution conventions, then instituted its own Oil Pollution Act in 
1990. After that, other new incidents again hit the coasts of Europe, more particularly 
with the Erika (before the coast of Brittany-France) in 1999 and the Prestige (before 
the coast of Gallicia-Spain) in 2002. Again, new changes to the conventions took 
place in order to increase the amounts available. Most recently in 2003, a 
Supplementary Fund was established to provide third-tier compensation in addition to 
the Liability Convention and the existing Fund. 
 
Of course, the problem of oil pollution is not at all limited to Europe and the US. With 
the demand for oil increasing in Asia, the sea borne oil trade has enormously 
increased to that continent as well. One reason is that Japan, as a major oil import 
country has become the biggest oil contributing State to the Fund. Another reason is 
that China, with its fast developing economy, has turned from an oil exporter into an 
oil importer, increasing the demand for oil transport. Also many Asian states have 
therefore recently been the victim of serious oil spills. 
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Not withstanding the ever changing legal landscape (more particularly the ever new 
amendments and changes to the existing conventions) the current international regime 
seems hardly able to provide an adequate prevention and compensation of oil spills. In 
that respect, it is, from a law and economics perspective, striking that the regime in 
the international convention is quite different than traditional tort law in most legal 
systems. For instance: not all parties involved in an oil pollution incident are held 
liable, but the liability is (often exclusively) directed to the tanker owner under the 
Liability Convention. The fact that a strict liability rule applies may not be such an 
exception, since that is often the case for environmental damage. However, in this 
case short statutes of limitation apply and there is a so-called cap on liability. Above 
the amount of limited liability of the tanker owner, compensation is provided through 
an International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, which is contributed by the oil 
receivers.  
 
The goal of our paper is to critically examine the compensation for oil pollution 
damage as arranged in the international conventions (more particularly the Liability 
Convention and the Fund Convention) from a law and economics perspective. The 
traditional economic analysis of accident law will be used to sketch how, from a 
theoretical perspective, the optimal compensation of victims of oil pollution damage 
should take place. Then, the conventions will be described and critically analyzed, 
using the economic framework. After this critical economic analysis, the question will 
also be addressed to what extent (at a normative level) suggestions for improvements 
of the current conventions could be made to make them more in line with the 
predictions of economic analysis.  
 
Hence, the paper will be structured as follows: after this introduction (1), a theoretical 
approach will be presented (2) whereby the basic economic literature will be used to 
indicate how compensation for victims of oil pollution damage could be arranged 
through various legal instruments in a way to increase social welfare. In that respect, 
attention will of course be given to the question whether victims are third parties or 
stand in a contractual relationship with the tanker owner (in which case the Coase 
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Theorem might provide a solution). The question of the efficient liability rule will be 
addressed (strict liability or negligence) as well as whether the contributory 
negligence of victims should be taken into account. Attention will also be given to the 
question whether a financial limit should be placed on the liability of the tanker owner 
and whether guarantees against insolvency should be provided. Given potentially 
limited possibilities of insurance markets, the question whether alternative 
compensation mechanisms (like a compensation fund) should be used will be 
addressed as well. Moreover, according to Shavell’s criteria, it will be examined 
whether the liability rules should be supplemented with regulation. 
 
After this theoretical approach, a brief overview of the legal regime as developed in 
the international conventions will be presented (3). Then, the existing legal regime (3) 
will be submitted to a critical economic test in (4) using the theoretical approach in 
(2). To the extent that the economic test leads to a finding that in some respects, the 
current legal situation does not match with the economic model finally some policy 
recommendations will be formulated (5) indicating how the reform process of the 
international conventions could benefit from economic analysis.  
 
2. Compensation for oil pollution damage: theoretical framework 
In this part of the paper we will simply use the existing economic literature on tort, 
insurance and regulation to examine how, from a theoretical perspective the 
compensation of oil pollution damage should be taken care of if economic goals were 
to be achieved by the policy maker. Of course there are many aspects concerning the 
compensation of victims of oil pollution which one could discuss. We will, however, 
limit ourselves to a few highly debated issues related to the international oil pollution 
conventions that constitute the main features of this compensation regime. The 
specific issues that we will address are the following: first the question whether a 
distinction between a contractual or a third party liability should be made (1), then 
what the nature of the liability rule should be (2), whether liability should be capped 
(as in the conventions) or be unlimited (3) and whether it should be exclusively 
channeled to the tanker owner (as in the conventions) or extended to the other parties 
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as well (4). The question also arises how financing of oil pollution damage can be 
guaranteed (5) and what conditions should be met to make an alternative 
compensation mechanism (like a fund solution) operate in an efficient manner (6). 
Finally the question will be addressed whether liability can be expected to have a 
deterrent effect in addition to the preventive role that safety regulation will play in this 
area (7). Other issues of interest, like procedural matters and the statute of limitations 
can equally be of interest from an economic perspective, but will, given space limits, 
not be discussed within the scope of this paper.  
 
2.1. The Coase theorem. 
Starting point for any economic analysis, also of the compensation for victims of oil 
pollution is undoubtedly the Coase theorem1. One can argue that the Coase theorem 
does have a relevance in the sense that there is a contractual relationship between the 
tanker owner who agrees to ship cargo with his tanker and on the other hand the party 
representing the cargo interests. In such a contractual bargaining setting parties could 
in principle ex ante agree on the optimal amount of care to be performed by the tanker 
owner, which could be related to the specific preferences of both parties and to e.g. 
their ability to seek insurance coverage. In that case the agreement concerning the 
distribution of risk might also be reflected in the contract price that has to be paid for 
shipping the oil (the freight).2 
 
A result of this reasoning is that it would in the context of liability for oil pollution 
damage in theory make no difference whether liability is allocated to either the tanker 
owner or to the cargo interests. As long as free negotiations (in a low transaction cost 
setting) are possible, shifting the liability e.g. to the tanker owner would simply mean 
that the price charged for transport would be increased. In the alternative it would be 
the cargo owner (in the assumption that that would be the presiding rule) that would 
bare the liability. In any event the cargo interests will pass on the costs of liability for 
                                           
1 Coase, R. A., “The problem of social cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, 1-44. 
2 See for an application of the Coase theorem to the issue of products liability Oi, W.Y.,”The 
economics of product safety”, Bell Journal of Economics, 1973, 3-28. 
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oil pollution damage to the end user of the cargo, being those who have a demand for 
oil related products.  
 
The Coase theorem of course only applies in the situation where passing on of costs of 
e.g. a tanker owner and the cargo interests is possible and may hence have its 
importance e.g. for the question whether liability should be allocated to one of these 
parties. In the assumption that the conditions of the Coase theorem are met one could 
argue that they should in principle not make a difference. It may only be different if 
costless passing on of increased liabilities were not possible. 
 
The same conclusion could also be reached with respect to another issue closely 
related to liability for oil pollution damage, being a financial cap on liability. Such a 
so-called financial cap is from a policy perspective not too problematic as long as this 
is (implicitly) agreed between a potential injurer (tanker owner) and a victim within a 
contractual setting. In the contractual setting well informed parties may agree to cap 
liability and in that particular case there is as such no specific reason for a legislative 
intervention, e.g. to prohibit a cap.  
 
The situation may only be different (and this may play an important role in the context 
of oil pollution damage) when the victim is not a party standing in a contractual 
relationship with the injurer, but a third party. In that case transaction costs are 
prohibitive and hence Coasean bargaining may not provide a solution. 
 
2.2. The liability rule 
Given the fact that many victims of oil pollution damage (e.g. coastal states) may not 
stand in a contractual relationship with the tanker owner a legislative intervention is 
necessary to remedy the externality resulting from oil pollution damage. A legal rule 
should thus be put in place to give the tanker owner appropriate incentives to follow 
an optimal care level. The economic literature on accident law has largely 
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demonstrated that liability rules may be put in place to serve this goal3. The outcome 
of this literature can well be applied to the case of oil pollution damage as well. The 
outcome of this literature is that in a so called unilateral accident case, being one 
where only one party (usually referred to as the injurer) can influence the accident risk 
both negligence and strict liability lead to efficient care levels, but only strict liability 
leads to an efficient activity level of the injurer as well4. The picture, however, 
changes somewhat when account is taken of the victim’s influence on the accident 
risk as well. This is usually referred to as the bilateral accident situation. In that case it 
is held that no liability rule is optimal5. The result is that it is usually held that in order 
to develop some kind of a test for strict liability one should examine whether it is 
more important to control the injurer’s activity than the victims. If it can be held that 
the injurers influence on the activity is far more important that the victims this may be 
an argument in favor of strict liability6. It is, however, important to stress that from 
the economic literature it follows that whenever the victim can have its influence on 
the care level as well (so-called bilateral accidents) a liability rule should be chosen 
that provides incentives to the victim for taking optimal care as well. This may either 
be a negligence rule or a defence which has to be added to the strict liability rule 
(comparative or contributory negligence)7.  
 
Applying these basic insights to the case of oil pollution damage one can hold that 
there may be a strong economic argument in favor of a strict liability rule. Oil 
                                           
3 For a summary of this literature see Shavell, S., Economic analysis of accident law, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1987 and Shavell, S., Foundations of economic analysis of law, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2004, 175-287. 
4 See Shavell, S., “Strict liability versus negligence”, Journal of Legal Studies, 1980, 1-25 and for a 
summary Schäfer, H. B. and Schönenberger, A., “Strict liability versus negligence” in Bouckaert, B. 
and De Geest, G. (eds), Encyclopaedia of law and economics, II civil law and economics, 2000, 597-
624. 
5 For the simple reason that strict liability with a contributory negligence defence will give optimal 
incentives for care and activity level to the injurer, but not to the victim (no optimal incentives to 
follow an optimal activity level), whereas negligence will give optimal incentives for care and the 
activity level to the victim, but not to the injurer (because the optimal activity level is not incorporated 
in to the negligent standard). 
6 See for a test for strict liability the classic contribution by Landes, W. and Posner, R., “The positive 
economic theory of tort law”, Georgia Law Review, 1981, 877-907. 
7 In both cases the contribution of the victim to the accident risk is taken in to account and the victim’s 
claim on damages will be reduced wholly (contributory) or partially (comparative negligence). For a 
discussion of the difference between both rules see e.g. Haddock, D. and Curran, C., “An economic 
theory of comparative negligence”, Journal of Legal Studies, 1985, 49-73. 
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pollution damage is certainly not purely unilateral. Also victims (like e.g. coastal 
states) may be able to take preventive measures once an oil pollution incident has 
occurred. However, the influence on the accident risk of the tanker owner seems to be 
far more important than that of the victim. Hence, according to the economic test, it 
seems far more important to control the injurer’s activity than the victims, which may 
create a preference for strict liability. A condition is, as indicated, that the victims care 
level would be controlled by adding a (comparative or contributory negligence) 
defence to the strict liability rule. Moreover, it should be added that the economic 
literature has equally indicated that strict liability provides incentives for prevention 
only in case the injurer has assets at stake to pay for the damage. In case of insolvency 
strict liability may lead to underdeterrence. Indeed, under negligence underdeterrence 
will only arise when the costs of taking efficient care are higher than the injurer’s 
wealth, whereas under strict liability underdeterrence already arises as soon as the 
magnitude of the damage is higher than the injurer’s wealth8. This means that this 
economic advantage of strict liability holds only in the hypotheses of full solvency of 
the injurer. If the injurer (the tanker owner in the case of oil pollution damage) were 
judgment proof a regulatory solution has to take care of the danger of underdeterrence 
resulting of the insolvency9. 
 
2.3. Financial caps on liability? 
As we show below, an important feature of the international liability conventions is 
that the tanker owner is not exposed to full liability, but that his liability is capped to 
an amount substantially lower than the amount of damage an average oil pollution 
incident may cause. How can one view these financial caps from an economic 
perspective?10  
 
                                           
8 See on these underdeterrence effects of strict liability Landes, W. and Posner, R., “Tort law as a 
regulatory regime for catastrophic personal injuries”, Journal of Legal Studies, 1984, 417-434. 
9 So also Shavell, S., “The judgment proof problem”, International Review of Law and Economics, 
1986, 43-58. 
10 For an economic analysis of financial caps see equally Faure, M., Fenn, P. and MacMinn, R., 
“Economic analysis of financial caps in accident law”, paper presented at the annual conference of the 
European Association of Law and Economics in Ghent, September 2000. 
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A distinction can be made between the situation where the victim stands in a 
contractual relationship with the injurer and the one where the victim is a third party. 
As we have just indicated, discussing the Coase theorem, financial caps on liability 
can be efficient in the contractual setting. In that case they could simply signal the 
division of risk bearing between e.g. the cargo owner and the tanker owner. 
Traditionally in maritime law there were always financial caps on the liability of the 
maritime transporter. A limited liability will of course be reflected in the transport 
price. In this particular contractual setting, where informed parties agree to cap a 
liability, this should not cause major worries from a policy perspective.  
 
The situation is of course different when, like in the case of oil pollution damage, 
victims are third parties and hence the Coase solution can not apply. Above we 
indicated that in the case of oil pollution damage strict liability may be warranted on 
the condition that a defence is introduced to give incentives for optimal care to 
victims as well. Only under strict liability would the potential injurer have an 
incentive to adopt an optimal activity level. This full internalization is obviously only 
possible if the injurer is effectively exposed to the full costs of the activity he engages 
in and is therefore in principle held to provide full compensation to a victim. An 
obvious disadvantage of a system of financial caps is that this will seriously impair 
the victim's rights to full compensation. But if the cap is indeed set at a much lower 
amount than the expected damage, this would not only violate the victim's right on 
compensation, but the above mentioned full internalization of the externality would 
not take place either. From an economic point of view a limitation of compensation 
therefore poses a serious problem since there will be no internalization of the risky 
activity.  
 
Indeed, if one believes that the exposure to liability has a deterrent effect, a limitation 
of the amount of compensation due to victims poses another problem. It has been 
argued that there is a direct relationship between the magnitude of the accident risk 
and the amount spent on care by the potential polluter. If the liability therefore is 
limited to a certain amount, the potential injurer will consider the accident as one with 
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a magnitude capped at the limited amount. Hence, he will not spend the care 
necessary to reduce the total accident costs. Obviously, the amount of care spent by 
the potential injurer will be lower and a problem of underdeterrence will arise. The 
amount of optimal care, reflected in the optimal standard, being the care necessary to 
reduce the total accident costs efficiently, will be higher than the amount the potential 
injurer will spend to avoid an accident equal to the statutory limited amount 11. 
 
The conclusion is, however, different in case of bilateral accidents, where the victim's 
behavior may also affect the accident risk. The standard argument against providing 
full compensation to victims in case of bilateral accidents is that victims can take 
precautionary measures which are not always observable by judges and which can 
therefore not be fully accounted for in contributory or comparative negligence 
defences12. A limit on the compensation in case of bilateral accidents may therefore 
be useful in cases where victims should be given additional incentives to reduce the 
accident risk. Whether caps are efficient in specific bilateral accident cases will 
depend on the circumstances. The question arises - inter alia - whether exposing the 
victim to risk is indeed necessary to provide these additional incentives or whether the 
victim's incentives can be optimally controlled via the contributory negligence 
defence. Also the amount of the cap remains important. If the cap were set too low 
this would give incentives to the victim but it could equally lead to serious 
underdeterrence of the injurer.  
 
Several scholars have applied these insights to the domain of nuclear liability where 
tight limits on liability are in place both in international conventions and in national 
                                           
11.See Faure, M. "Economic Models of Compensation for Damages caused by Nuclear Accidents: some 
lessons for the division of the Paris and Vienna conventions", European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 1995, 21-43. 
12.This point has been made by Rea, S.,“Non-pecuniary loss and breach of contract“, Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1982, 50-52, but also by Adams, M., "Warum kein Ersatz von Nichtvermögensschäden" in Ott, 
C. and Schäfer, H.B. (eds.), Allokationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung, Berlin, Springer, 214 and by 
Ott, C. and Schäfer, H.B., "Schmerzensgeld bei Körperverletzungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse", 
Juristenzeitung, 1990, 564-565. 
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legislation. It has been argued that these caps inefficiently dampen the operator’s 
incentives to take precautions13. 
 
2.4. Allocation of liability. 
Another feature of the international conventions is the so-called channeling of 
liability. This channeling means that the convention or statute indicates which (of 
many possible) parties can be held liable for the loss and is often exclusive. Thus the 
question arises whether in the context of oil pollution damage it would e.g. make 
sense to impose (limited) liability for the consequences of oil pollution damage 
exclusively on one party, say the tanker owner. This would mean that liability would 
effectively be “channeled” to the tanker owner and that liability suits either on other 
grounds against the tanker owner or against third parties are excluded.  
 
Again, within the context of the Coase theorem one could argue that it would 
theoretically make no difference on which of the potential liable parties that 
contributed to the risk liability is allocated since the liable party might be able to pass 
on his liability on the basis of contract. If such a shifting of the liability burden (e.g. 
between the tanker owner and the cargo interest) could take place the liability would 
simply be transferred following the Coase theorem14. If a legislator would e.g. decide 
that a tanker owner would be exclusively liable this should not necessarily be a 
problem to the extent that the liability costs could be passed on to the ones who 
actually contributed to the loss as well. However, this private re-allocation of liability 
may not always be possible and may also be limited as a result of insolvency of one of 
the parties involved.  
 
                                           
13.See Faure, M. and Van den Bergh, R., "Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium from an interest 
group perspective", International Review of Law and Economics, 1990, 241, Faure, M., "Economic 
models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents: some lessons for the revision of the 
Paris and Vienna conventions", European Journal of Law and Economics, 1995, (21) 29-31 and 
Trebilcock, M. and Winter, R., "The Economics of Nuclear Accident Law", International Review of 
Law and Economics, 1997, 215-243. 
14 See for an analysis of the channeling in nuclear liability Trebilcock, M. and Winter, R., “The 
economics of nuclear accident law”, International Review of Law and Economics, 1997, 232-235. 
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Hence, several scholars have argued that this regime of channeling is inefficient from 
an economic perspective at least if one believes that an exposure to liability provides 
incentives for prevention. It is particularly the aspect that channeling leads to a sole 
liability of the operator, with the exclusion of liability suits against third parties who 
have contributed to the loss which is criticized in the literature.15 Indeed, one can well 
imagine situations, for instance in oil pollution cases where another party has 
contributed to the loss as well, for instance the one who may have delivered defective 
nuclear material that contributed to the loss. Exclusive channeling means that the 
victim no longer has the right to sue another party who could have influenced the 
accident risk as well. The effect is of course in the first place that the victim’s claim 
may not be fully satisfied and hence one could criticize channeling from a distributive 
perspective. Moreover, that third party who has contributed to the loss should of 
course be exposed to liability in order to give him incentives for prevention. If the 
effect of the channeling is that the third party is no longer liable, this seems clearly 
inefficient. 
 
Channeling may well have this effect, especially in the oil pollution case since the 
liability of the tanker owner (to which liability is channeled) is, moreover, also limited 
because financial caps are introduced on the compensation due to the victim. Hence, 
the effect of the combination of a financial cap with channeling is that the victim can 
exclusively sue the tanker owner, where he is confronted with financial cap. The 
victim has no additional possibility to bring another law suit if, as a result of the cap, 
his damage were not fully compensated. A suit based on tort law against the tanker 
owner for the amount not covered by the cap is excluded in the convention and a suit 
against a third liable party is usually excluded because of the channeling as well. 
 
                                           
15 For a critical economic analysis of the channeling of nuclear liability see Vanden Borre, T., 
“Transplantatie van ‘kanalisatie van aansprakelijkheid’ van het kernenergierecht naar het milieu 
(aansprakelijkheids)recht: een goede of een gebrekkige zaak?”, in: Faure, M./Deketelaere K. (eds.), Ius 
Commune en Milieurecht, Actualia in het Milieurecht in België en Nederland, 1997, pp. 329-382 and 
Vanden Borre, T., Efficiënte preventie en compensatie van catastroferisico’s. Het voorbeeld van 
schade door kernongevallen, 2001, pp. 693-701. 
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The argument which is sometimes used to defend channeling, is that it makes the life 
of the victim so much easier since he will no longer have to investigate who precisely 
the liable injurer is (in case of an accident with multiple injurers). The convention 
indeed simplifies the life of the victim by indicating that he can only sue the injurer to 
which liability is channeled. Thus, one could recognize an argument that channeling 
would lead to a reduction of transaction costs.16 However, this seems hardly valid: the 
additional benefit of channeling for the victim is limited (the costs of finding out that 
it is e.g. the tanker owner who may be primarily liable are not that high), whereas the 
disadvantages for the victim are huge (he no longer has the possibility to claim his 
damage from other parties who may have contributed to the loss as well). From a 
victim’s and from a deterrence perspective, one may well argue that a joint and 
several liability rule may be preferable: in that case, the victim can simply sue any of 
the available injurers who are all exposed to liability and claim full compensation.  
 
In sum, from an economic perspective one would prefer a situation where all those 
who contributed in some way to the risk are exposed to liability so that they receive 
optimal incentives to reduce the accident risk.  
 
2.5. Compulsory insurance 
We already mentioned that a strict liability rule can be considered efficient only if 
there is no insolvency risk. Indeed, Insolvency may pose a problem of 
underdeterrence. If the expected damage largely exceeds the injurer’s assets the 
injurer will only have incentives to purchase liability insurance up to the amount of 
his own assets. He is indeed only exposed to the risk of losing his own assets in a 
liability suit. The judgement-proof problem may therefore lead to underinsurance and 
thus to underdeterrence. Jost has rightly pointed to the fact that in these circumstances 
of insolvency, compulsory insurance might provide an optimal outcome.17 By 
                                           
16 See Vanden Borre, T., Efficiënte preventie en compensatie van catastroferisico’s. Het voorbeeld van 
schade door kernongevallen, 2001, pp. 698-699. 
17 Jost, P.J., Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance, IRLE, 1996, 259-276. A 
similar argument has recently been formulated by Polborn, M., Mandatory Insurance and the 
Judgement-Proof Problem, IRLE, 1998, 141-146 and by Skogh, G., “Mandatory Insurance: Transaction 
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introducing a duty to purchase insurance coverage for the amount of the expected 
loss, better results will be obtained than with insolvency whereby the magnitude of 
the loss exceeds the injurer’s assets.18 In the latter case the injurer will indeed only 
consider the risk as one where he could at most lose his own assets and will set his 
standard of care accordingly. When he is, under a duty to insure, exposed to full 
liability the insurer will obviously have incentives to control the behaviour of the 
insured. Via the traditional instruments for the control of moral hazard the insurer can 
make sure that the injurer will take the necessary care to avoid an accident with the 
real magnitude of the loss. Thus Jost and Skogh argue that compulsory insurance can, 
provided that the moral hazard problem can be cured adequately, provide better results 
than under the judgement-proof problem.  
 
This economic argument shows that insolvency may cause potentially responsible 
parties to externalise harm: they may be engaged in activities which may cause harm 
which can largely exceed their assets. Without financial provisions these costs would 
be thrown on society and would hence be externalised instead of internalised. Such an 
internalisation can be reached if the insurer is able to control the behaviour of the 
insured. The insurer could set appropriate policy conditions and require an adequate 
(risk related) premium. This shows that if the moral hazard problem can be cured 
adequately insurance even leads to a higher deterrence than a situation without 
liability insurance and insolvency19. 
 
2.6. Alternative financial mechanisms 
From the above it follows that if one fears that those on which liability for oil 
pollution damage is placed (e.g. the tanker owner)  might be insolvent (in the sense 
                                                                                                                         
Costs Analysis of Insurance”, in: Bouckaert, B./De Geest, G. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, 2000, pp.521-537. Skogh has also pointed out that compulsory insurance may save on 
transaction cost. 
18 See also Kunreuther, H./Freeman, P., “Insurability, environmental risks and the law”, in: Heyes, A. 
(ed.), The Law and Economics of the Environment, 2001, p. 316. 
19 There are, however, also a few dangers that should be taken in to account when a duty to insure is 
introduced. One of them is that the moral hazard problem should be cured; another that there may not 
be concentration on insurance markets. For these potential dangers of compulsory insurance see Faure, 
M. (ed), Deterrence, insurability and compensation in environmental liability. Future developments in 
the European Union, New York, Springer, 2003, 185-189. 
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that the amount of the damage which they may cause could be higher than their 
wealth) a duty to seek financial coverage (through insurance or alternative 
mechanisms20) should be introduced. However, the amount of oil pollution damage 
may be that large that even traditional insurance mechanisms or pooling by operators 
(S&I-clubs) may not provide sufficient coverage. The question then arises whether 
supplementary funding should be provided through e.g. a compensation fund and 
what can be suggested as far as the efficiency of such a fund mechanism is concerned. 
 
First, no matter how a compensation system is organized, the incentives for 
prevention of pollution damage should always remain untouched. Liability rules can 
only have a preventive effect if the duty to compensate is put on the one who actually 
contributed to the risk. The same applies to compensation funds. This means that a 
duty to contribute to the fund should in principle only rest upon the one who actually 
contributed to the risk. 
 
A second, related principle is that this duty to contribute should also be related to the 
amount in which the specific activity or entrepreneur contributed to the risk. This 
principle is usually automatically respected in liability law. The duty to compensate 
under tort law is indeed usually limited to the damage that the specific tortfeasor 
himself caused.21 However, also if a collectivisation of the compensation takes place, 
it remains important to guarantee that the tortfeasor only contributes financially in 
relation to the amount in which he contributed to the risk as well. This is reflected in 
insurance policies in the idea of risk differentiation. It simply means that bad risks pay 
a higher premium than good risks. This principle should also be applied if a 
compensation fund is installed, meaning that bad risks should contribute more to the 
compensation system than good risks. This remains important since it will give 
incentives for prevention to the contributors to the fund. Bad risks will be punished 
and good risks should be rewarded. 
 
                                           
20 See Faure, M. (ed), “Alternative compensation mechanisms as remedies for an insurability of 
liability”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 29, nr. 3, 2004, 455-489. 
21 Unless there would be joint & several or channeling of liability. See Chapter V, H. 
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These principles are not only important from an efficiency point of view (providing 
optimal incentives for prevention), but also include a fairness element. Indeed, if these 
principles were not followed, it would mean that good risks would have to pay for the 
bad risks as well and would therefore in fact subsidise bad risks. This negative 
redistribution should be avoided and therefore the compensation mechanism, fund or 
insurance, should be financed principally by the ones who really contributed to the 
damage. 
 
To summarise, the (supplementary) compensation mechanism should aim at a 
differenttiation of the contributions due. This differentiation is only possible if the 
insurance company or agency administering the fund also possesses information on 
the amount in which the specific activity contributed to the risk. One key element to 
determine the choice between insurance or funds is therefore who possesses the best 
information to control the risk. 
 
2.7. Liability versus regulation 
So far in this paper we have addressed the compensation for oil pollution damage 
from an economic perspective, whereby the notion is stressed that laying an duty on 
those who cause the pollution incident will hopefully have a deterrent effect. 
However, it has equally been indicated in the literature, more particularly by Shavell 
that especially as far as environmental risks are concerned regulation may be a more 
appropriate instrument than liability rules22. The criteria are well known: if 
information on optimal safety devices can better be acquired through the government 
than through the private parties, if there is a serious insolvency risk and if the threat of 
a liability suit may be low there is a strong argument in favour of regulation. All of 
these arguments may apply in the case of oil pollution damage.  
 
                                           
22 See Shavell, S., “Liability for harm versus regulation of safety”, Journal of Legal Studies, 1984, 357-
374, Shavell, S., “A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation”, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 1984, 271-280 and Shavell, S., Economic analysis of accident law, 277-290. 
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If one looks at the first criterion, that of information costs, it must be stressed that an 
assessment of the risks of a certain activity often requires expert knowledge and 
judgement. Smaller organisations (also ship-owners) might lack the incentive or 
resources to invest in research to find out what the optimal care level (tanker design) 
would be. Also, there would be little incentive to carry out intensive research if the 
results were automatically available to competitors in the market: this is the well-
known “free rider” problem. This problem can partially be countered by legal 
instruments granting an intellectual property right to the results of the research. 
However, the problem remains that it may not be possible for small companies to 
undertake studies on the optimal technology for preventing environmental damage. 
Therefore, it is often more efficient to allow the government itself to do the research 
on the optimal technology. The results of this research can then be passed on to the 
parties in the market through the regulation. Hence, the setting of safety standards in 
regulation can be seen as a means of passing on information on the minimal safety 
technology required. Obviously, it is more efficient for the government to acquire 
information on the optimal safety standard for tanker design than it would be for an 
individual firm, for instance, to find out what additional reduction in the probability of 
oil pollution would produce an optimal reduction of the expected damage. There are 
hence undeniable “economy-of-scale” advantages in regulation of tanker design. 
 
Also, the insolvency argument points in the direction of regulation. Pollution can be 
caused by ships with assets which are generally lower than the damage they can 
cause. In this respect it should not be forgotten that even a small firm could cause 
harm to a large number of individuals or to entire ecosystems. The amount of damage 
caused by this pollution can of course largely exceed his individual assets. Moreover, 
most firms have been incorporated as a legal entity and therefore benefit from limited 
liability. Hence, the individual shareholders are not liable to the extent of their 
personal assets, but a creditor of the firm can only lay claim to part on all of the total 
assets purchased in the firm by the shareholders. 
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Also the chances of a liability suit being brought for damage caused by wrongful oil 
pollution is naturally very low. The damage is often spread over a large number of 
people, who will have difficulties to organise themselves to bring a law suit. The 
source of the oil polution may often also be unknown. This will bring proof of 
causation and latency problems, which will only make it difficult for a lawsuit to be 
brought against the polluter. 
 
For these reasons it is clear that some form of regulation of tanker design 
environmental pollution is necessary. To reformulate: this shows that liability rules 
alone can not suffice to prevent oil pollution, but there might be other, publicly 
imposed instruments than which can be used to reach this goal. 
 
Although there is thus a strong argument to control the oil pollution risk through ex 
ante regulation in individual cases there still can be damage to the environment. Then 
again, liability under tort comes into the picture and the question has been addressed 
in the literature how regulation influences the liability system and vice versa. The 
complementary relationship between tort law and regulation has been examined in 
detail by Rose-Ackerman,23 Faure/Ruegg,24 Kolstad/Ulen/Johnson25 and recently by 
Arcuri26 and Burrows.27 Rose-Ackerman also compared US and European 
experiences in using regulation versus tort law in environmental policy.28 The first 
                                           
23 Rose-Ackerman, S., Rethinking the Progressive Agenda. The Reform of the American Regulatory 
State, 1992, pp. 118-131; Rose-Ackerman, S., “Environmental Liability Law”, in: Tietenberg, T.H. 
(ed.), Innovation in Environmental Policy, Economic and Legal Aspects of Recent Developments in 
Environmental Enforcement and Liability, 1992, pp. 223-243 and Rose-Ackerman, S., “Public Law 
versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union Proposals in the Light of United 
States and German Experiences”, in: Eide, E./Van den Bergh, R. (eds.), Law and Economics of the 
Environment, 1996, pp. 13-39. 
24 Faure, M. and Ruegg, M., “Standard Setting through General Principles of Environmental Law”, in: 
Faure, M., Vervaele, J. and Weale, A. (eds.), Environmental Standards in the European Union in an 
Interdisciplinary Framework, 1994, pp. 39-60. 
25 Kolstad, Ch.D., Ulen, Th.S. and Johnson, G.V., “Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Compliments?”, American Economic Review 88 (AER), 1990, 888-901. 
26 Arcuri, A., “Controlling environmental risk in Europe: the complementary role of an EC 
environmental liability regime”, Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid (TMA), 2001, pp. 39-40. 
27 Burrows, P., “Combining regulation and liability for the control of external costs”, IRLE, 1999, 227-
242. 
28 Rose-Ackerman, S., “Public Law versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union 
Proposals in the Light of United States Experience”, 4 Review of European Community and 
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point which is often stressed is that the fact that there are many arguments in favor of 
ex ante regulation of the environment, does not mean that the tort system should not 
be used any longer for its deterring and compensating functions. One reason for still 
relying on the tort system is that the effectiveness of (environmental) regulation is 
dependent upon enforcement, which may be weak. In addition, the influence of lobby 
groups on regulation, to which public choice theory has rightly pointed, can to some 
extent be overcome by combining safety regulation and liability rules. Hence, from 
the above it follows that although there is a strong case for safety regulation to control 
the environmental risk, tort rules will still play an important role as well.29 
 
2.8. Summary 
From this brief overview of the economic literature one can hold that since victims of 
oil pollution are usually third parties some form of regulation is necessary to control 
the oil pollution risk, given prohibitive transaction costs. Since the tanker owner’s 
activity is probably more important than the victim’s a strict liability on the tanker 
owner might be efficient. However, since most oil pollution incidents can be 
considered as bilateral accidents a defence should be added to the strict liability rule 
to provide efficient incentives for care to the victim as well. The liability of all those 
who contribute to the oil pollution risk should in principle be unlimited. Hence there 
should be no exclusive channeling to one party, say to a tanker owner, nor should 
there be any limit put on the liability of the parties involved. Such a limit may be 
considered efficient only in the bilateral case and only under the strict assumption that 
the (contributory or comparative negligence) defence would not be able to sufficiently 
take into account the victims behavior. However, since it is more important to control 
the injurer’s behavior in this particular case a cap probably has more negative effects 
(on the injurers incentives to take care) than benefits (of additional care from victims).  
 
                                                                                                                         
International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 312-332 and Rose-Ackerman, S., Controlling 
Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States (1995). 
29 For a recent different analysis, leading to the same result that liability and regulation should be 
combined see Schmitz, P.W., “On the joint use of liability and safety regulation”, 20 IRLE, 2000, 371-
382. 
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Given the insolvency risk a duty to seek financial coverage may be imposed on 
injurers, although this should not necessarily be in the form of insurance. Moreover, 
traditional insurance markets may (given the large potential damage caused by a 
major pollution incident) not be able to provide adequate compensation. Therefore 
alternative compensation mechanisms like compensation funds may be needed. In that 
case it is, however, important to apply principles of risk differentiation as far as 
possible. This means that the contribution to the fund should in principle be done by 
those who create the risk and to the amount that they create the risk. This of course 
assumes that the costs of further differentiation are lower than the benefits.  
 
Although, at least theoretically, a deterrent effect can be expected from using liability 
rules to deter oil pollution incidents, the most important preventive instruments 
probably come through regulation. But notwithstanding the primary role of regulation 
there may be an additional (stop-gap) effect of liability rules that can be used in 
addition to the regulatory system to deter oil pollution. 
 
We will now address to what extent the international oil pollution conventions 
correspond to these theoretical starting points from the economic literature.  
 
3. The legal regime 
We will now sketch the international oil pollution compensation regime as it has been 
developed through the International Maritime Organization. Thus we first provide a 
brief overview of the legal instruments (1), then discuss the type of liability rule (2) 
and the channeling of liability to the tanker owner (3). Then the financial limit on 
liability and its justification is discussed (4) as well as compulsory insurance (5). 
Attention is also paid to the reasons for and working of the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund (6) and at to the regulation aiming at the prevention of pollution 
incidents (7). 
 
The regulation can only be discussed very briefly (since it is very extensive). In 
addition we merely briefly address the conventions as developed within the IMO 
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framework. Other legal regimes, like e.g. the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 will hence 
not be discussed within the scope of this paper. We will not only briefly sketch the 
contents of the rules as they can be found in the conventions, but, (where possible) 
briefly address the legal history of the convention as well since this may shed some 
light on the justifications and reasons for the particular regime. 
 
3.1. Overview 
The international regime on civil liability and compensation for oil pollution was 
originally established through two International Conventions, The International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (1969 Civil Liability 
Convention, referred to as the 1969 CLC) and the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 
1971 (referred to as the 1971 Fund Convention). 
 
The International Conventions came as a reaction to the Torrey Canyon incident in 
1967, which spilled 117,000 tonnes of crude oil and polluted the south-west coast of 
the UK and the Brittany coast of France with the total damage in the two countries 
exceeding 6 million pounds (but it was finally settled for 3.8 million pounds).30 The 
Torrey Canyon oil spill incident has revealed the need for an international system on 
civil liability and compensation for oil pollution. Hence, the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (the IMCO, later in 1982 its name has been 
changed to the International Maritime Organization, referred to as the IMO) convened 
a Diplomatic Conference which adopted the 1969 CLC. In this Convention, some 
basic principles for oil pollution compensation were decided, mainly the strict liability 
on the ship-owner up to certain limit, compulsory insurance and the liability 
channeled exclusively to the ship-owner and its insurer.  
 
                                           
30 Tanikawa, H., “A Revolution in Maritime Law: a History of the Original Legal Frameworkd on Oil 
Spill Liability and Compensation”, in The IOPC Funds’ 25 Years of Compensating Victims of Oil 
Pollution Incidents, London, The IOPC Funds, 2003, 51. 
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However, the 1969 CLC was considered not satisfactory since it could not afford 
adequate compensation especially in case of serious oil spills due to the financial caps 
on the liability. The shipping industry also felt it had to bear a heavy financial burden 
due to the system of strict liability and compulsory insurance. Under this situation, the 
1971 Fund Convention was adopted as a compromise solution to offer adequate 
compensation to pollution victims and to relieve the additional financial burden 
imposed on the ship-owner by the 1969 CLC. Hence, the 1971 Fund Convention set 
up an International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (the IOPC Fund or the Fund), 
which is contributed by the oil receivers. The Fund Convention would apply where 
there was no liability for the damage under the CLC, or where the ship-owner liable 
for the damage under the CLC was financially incapable of meeting his obligations, or 
where the pollution damage exceeds the limitation of liability of the ship-owner.31 The 
1971 Fund also indemnified the ship-owner and its insurer under certain 
circumstances to the amount of the financial caps provided under the CLC. 
 
However, when the CLC came into force in 1975 and the Fund Convention came into 
force in 1978, the situations have already changed since then. It is considered 
“necessary for the international oil pollution compensation regime to respond and 
adapt to changing circumstances and to new political and social expectations”.32 
Moreover, another oil spill incident (Amoco Cadiz) demonstrated the insufficiency of 
the existing compensation system. Hence, the International Conventions were in the 
need of updating. 
 
The first major amendments took place in 1992 whereby the 1992 Protocols were 
adopted. In these Protocols, the amount of financial caps was increased, the scope of 
application of the Convention was expanded to include the situation where there is an 
imminent threat of damage and to cover damage which occurred in exclusive 
economic zones (EEC). The second major changes to the international regime on civil 
liability for marine oil pollution took place in 2000, whereby the amount of 
                                           
31 Article 4 (1) of the 1971 Fund Convention. 
32 Jamieson, D., The IOPC Funds’ 25 Years of Compensating Victims of Oil Pollution Incidents, 
London, The IOPC Funds, 2003, 6. 
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compensation available was doubled. The most recent changes occurred in the year 
2003, when a Protocol on the Supplementary Fund was adopted. In the same year, a 
voluntary agreement to increase the limitation amount for small tankers was adopted.  
 
During the 90s when there were two compensating Funds co-existing, as a result of 
more and more countries joining the 1992 Fund, the 1971 Fund was confronted with 
great difficulty. Hence, it was decided that the 1971 Fund was terminated in 2002. 
However, there are still two CLC functioning at the same time. Although the 1969 
CLC is losing power due to the denunciation of major shipping countries, it still has 
some 40 Member States, mainly countries from Africa, South America and the 
Middle East. 
 
Despite all the changes to the compensation regime for oil pollution damage through 
the years, some principles remain primarily the same since its establishment. These 
include, inter alia, the principles of strict liability, channeling of liability, limitation of 
liability and compulsory insurance. 
 
Hence, in this part of the paper, the principles concerning the liability for marine oil 
pollution with their changes will be examined. Moreover, in addition to the 
compensation for pollution damage ex post, there are also international conventions 
dealing with the preventive measures on marine oil pollution ex ante. Thus, the 
regulations on prevention will examined in contrast with the liability rules. 
 
3.2. Liability rule 
As we have mentioned before, the 1969 CLC adopted a strict liability, which was 
contrary to the traditional maritime liability rules based on fault. This strict liability of 
the ship-owner has been widely accepted nowadays even in other areas of maritime 
law, and it remains one basic principle of the CLC. However, at the 1969 Conference 
negotiating the CLC, the issues on the legal basis for liability and who should be the 
party to assume liability was a very debated issue. 
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The debates concerning the liability rules mainly centered around the question 
whether the risk of oil pollution is created by the nature of oil or by the special form 
of transportation, which party has the actual control over the cargo and thus in a better 
position to take preventive measures to minimize damage, which party is financially 
capable of paying the huge mount of compensation for oil pollution damage, who 
should be the ultimate beneficiary and thus should bear the consequences thereof.33 
However, none of these arguments were sufficient to gain the support of the majority 
of the delegations. The opinions of the delegations were divergent. Some states with a 
strong shipping industry were in favor of a liability imposed on the part of the cargo, 
while some states with a strong oil industry supported liability on the ship-owner.34  
 
It was only until the Belgian delegation submitted a proposal on an international 
compensation fund that the delegations saw some hope of a compromise. Envisaging 
the additional tier of compensation from the fund contributed by the oil industry, the 
strict liability of the ship-owner was adopted with a slight majority.35 
 
Article III (1) of the 1969 CLC provided that the ship-owner should be strictly liable 
for the “pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from 
the ship as a result the incident” unless he can prove that he can be exempted under 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article. 
 
The exemptions provided in paragraph 2 of Article III are mainly act of war or force 
majeur, third party’s intentional act, and negligence or other wrongful act of 
Government or public authority in the maintenance of lights or other navigational 
aids.  
                                           
33 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Documents LEG/CONF/C.2/SR3 – 13, IMO, 625 - 689. 
34 Shipping countries advocating liability on the cargo owner include, inter alia, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Greece and Norway. On the other hand, Japan as a big oil import country 
advocated liability on the ship-owner. 
35 The decision on the liability rules to be adopted was taken in two steps due to the complication of the 
issue. First concerning whether the liability should rest on the ship or on the cargo, 25 (out of 38) votes 
were in favor of ship’s liability while 13 votes against; second, concerning the nature of liability (strict 
or fault liability), 22 (out of 42) votes were in favor of strict liability, and 17 were in favor of fault 
liability, with 3 abstentions. Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine 
Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR 9, IMO, 664 – 665. 
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The contributory negligence of the oil pollution victims may lead to the exemption of 
the ship-owner’s liability to the extent of the victim’s negligence. As provided in 
Article III (3) of the 1969 CLC, the ship-owner can be wholly or partially exonerated 
from liability if he can prove that “the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially 
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who 
suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person”.  
 
In case of multiple tortfeasors, being when the pollution damage is caused by oil 
escaped from tow or more ships, the ship-owners of all ships concerned “shall be 
jointly and severally liable for such all such damage which is not reasonably 
separable”.36 
 
Thus the strict liability of the ship-owner in case of marine oil pollution is established 
in the 1969 CLC, and it remained unchanged in the later 1992 Protocols. 
 
3.3. Channeling 
It was probably under the influence of the nuclear conventions adopted in the 60s 
which channeled the liability to the operator of nuclear installations,37 that the 1969 
Diplomatic Conference adopted the channeling provision even without much 
discussion or justification. Since the strict liability on the ship-owner was adopted, it 
was assumed that the channeling to this party was established as well.  
 
Article III (4) of the 1969 CLC stipulated that no claims for pollution damage under 
the CLC or otherwise “may be made against the servants or agents” of the ship-owner. 
However, this does not preclude the right of recourse actions of the ship-owner 
                                           
36 Article V of the 1969 CLC. 
37 There were mainly three international conventions related to nuclear installation at the time, being 
the Paris Convention on third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 (with a 
supplementary convention on 31 January 1963), the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators 
of Nuclear Ships of 25 May 1962 and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 
21 May 1963. The Nuclear conventions channeled the liability to the operator of the nuclear installation 
operator. For a detailed analysis of the channeling in the nuclear conventions, see the references in note 
15, supra. 
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against third parties.38 Such a channeling provision was modified in 1992 CLC, 
although channeling as a principle was not abandoned. 
 
In the 1992 CLC, there is a list of the parties that are excluded from the liable party in 
Article III (4). In addition to the servants and agents of the ship-owner as originally 
specified in the 1969 CLC, the pilot, the charterer, manager or operator of the ship, 
the person performing salvage operations, and any person taking preventive measures 
are also specifically mentioned in the list. Hence, all claims against them are 
excluded. 
 
A Working Group of the Fund was set up in 2000 to consider the adequacy of the 
international compensation regime. The channeling provision in the 1992 CLC 
precluded claims for compensation being pursued against a number of parties 
including the charterer. The Working Group was considering a proposal that these 
provisions should be amended so as to revert to the channeling provisions in the 1969 
CLC, which excluded only claims against the servants or agents of the ship-owner. A 
number of Member States considered that the benefit to the victims offered by the 
current channeling provision was of paramount importance, but supported exploring 
further a proposal to include charterer’s liability in the compensation regime. So far 
there is no conclusive decision on the channeling adopted yet. 
 
3.4. Limitation of liability 
Limitation of liability of the ship-owner has a long tradition in maritime law. Lots of 
important institutions in maritime law have developed on the basis of the limitation 
system. The limitation mechanism emerged in maritime law because it was needed to 
encourage ship-owners to invest in the highly risky maritime adventure.39  
 
                                           
38 Article III (5) of the 1969 CLC. 
39 Seward, R., “The Insurance Viewpoint”, in The Limitation of Ship-owners’ Liability: The New Law, 
Sweet & Maxwell Institute of Maritime Law, 1986, 163 – 185. 
26 
 
 
 
 
Before the international regime on civil liability for marine oil pollution had come 
into being, there were already international conventions concerning the limitation of 
liability of the ship-owners, being the 1924 and 1957 Conventions.40 It is probably 
due to the long history of limiting the ship-owner’s liability in maritime law that the 
limitation of the ship-owner’s liability in case of an oil spill was unanimously 
accepted as a principle at the 1969 Diplomatic Conference. Moreover, the limit on the 
liability was considered necessary to offset the heavy burden imposed on the ship-
owner via strict liability.  
 
The major debates on the limitation of liability concerned the specific amount of the 
limitation. The factors raised at the 1969 Conference influencing the limitation 
amount are that first of all, this amount should provide adequate compensation to the 
victims, which corresponds with the magnitude of the pollution damage41. Second, 
this amount should be the maximum amount that is insurable.42 Moreover, it was 
pointed out that a too high limit may put smaller ships in disadvantage, while a too 
low limit might favor the big size ships. So the limit should not cause injustice to 
ships of different sizes.43  
 
However, the limitation figure of 2000 francs per ton with a ceiling of 210 million 
francs under the 1969 CLC was finally decided as figure which was believed to 
provide sufficient compensation and the maximum amount acceptable to the 
insurance industry, notwithstanding the lack of justification with objective criteria or 
data. This has in fact doubled the then prevailing amount of limitation of the ship-
owners under the 1957 Limitation Convention, which means that the liability of a 
ship-owner in case of an oil spill is much higher than in case of other maritime 
casualties. 
                                           
40 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of the 
Liability of Owners of Sea-going Vessels, 1924; International Convention relating to the Limitation of 
Liability of the Owners of Seagoing Ships, 1957. 
41 Nevertheless there was no discussion of the actual amount of the damage in case of a (serious) oil 
spill incident. 
42 This concern was raised particularly by the UK delegation. See Official Records of the International 
Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR17, IMO, 727. 
43 India as a representative raised such argument. See ibid, 732. 
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The 1992 CLC in Article V has increased the financial limits, and later in 2000 
Protocols, these limits were again increased by 50.73%.44 Today the situation is as 
follows: 
– For a ship not exceeding 5,000 gross tonnage: the liability is limited to 4.51 million 
SDR, approximately 5.78 million US$ (under 1992 CLC, the limit was 3 million 
SDR) 
– For a ship 5000 to 140,000 gross tonnage: the liability is limited to 4.51 million 
SDR plus 631 SDR (US$ 807) for each additional gross tonne over 5,000 (under 1992 
CLC, the limit was 3 million SDR plus 420 SDR for each additional gross tonne) 
– For a ship over 140,000 gross tonnage: the liability is limited to 89.77 million SDR, 
approximately US$ 115 million (under 1992 CLC, the limit was 59.7 million SDR) 
 
These increases in compensation limits seem impressive as the amounts available 
were substantially increased. However, before the 2000 Protocols entered into force, 
another major accident Prestige happened which again showed that the compensation 
regime was not adequate. 
 
3.5. Compulsory insurance 
After witnessing the dramatic damage caused by the Torrey Canyon incident, 
realizing the difficulty in getting compensation from the liable party especially in case 
of insolvency of the ship-owner, most of the delegations at the 1969 Conference 
supported the mechanism of compulsory insurance as a means of ensuring the 
application of strict liability imposed by the CLC. However, there were doubts about 
the capacity of the insurance market and difficulties in implementing the compulsory 
insurance. The compulsory insurance was nevertheless adopted by an absolute 
majority at the 1969 Conference.45 
                                           
44 According to the provision on amendment procedures in the 1992 Protocols (Article 15 under the 
1992 CLC and Article 31 under the 1992 Fund Convention), these limits cannot be increased by more 
than 50%. 
45 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR14, IMO, 701-710. 
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Not all the tankers are obliged to take out insurance, as specified in Article VII of the 
1969 CLC. Only ships “carrying more than 2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo” are 
required to maintain insurance or other financial security for their pollution damage 
liability provided in the CLC up to the amount of the limits of liability.  
 
Moreover, under the provision of Article VII (8) of the 1969 CLC, the claimant is 
entitled to proceed directly against the insurer or other financial guarantor of the ship-
owner. This is the so-called direct action. In the case of direct action, the insurer or 
financial guarantor as defendant, shall enjoy the same defenses that the ship-owner 
would have been able to invoke, except for bankruptcy or winding up of the ship-
owner.  
 
As for the application of the compulsory insurance, the State has an important role to 
play. The 1969 CLC provided that the authority of the State where the ship is 
registered shall issue a certificate attesting that the insurance or other financial 
guarantee required in this Convention is in force.46 Moreover, the State has the 
obligation to enforce the provision of compulsory insurance in the sense that it has to 
ensure the availability of such insurance or financial guarantee with regard to the 
ships that fly its flag or those enter or leave its territory or territorial sea. First, the 
Contracting State shall not permit a ship under its flag “to trade” unless a required 
certificate has been issued.47 However, “to trade” is a rather vague concept and there 
is no specific provision on how a State could forbid the ship to trade in such a case. 
Second, the State shall ensure under its national legislation that the required insurance 
or financial guarantee should be in force with respect to the ships carrying more than 
2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo “entering or leaving a port in its territory, or arriving 
at or leaving an off-shore terminal in its territorial sea”.48 
 
                                           
46 Article VII (2) of the 1969 CLC. 
47 Article VII (10) of the 1969 CLC. 
48 Article VII (11) of the 1969 CLC. 
29 
 
 
 
 
The provisions concerning compulsory insurance remain basically unchanged in the 
1992 Protocols, and the minimum requirement for ships to take insurance still remains 
at 2000 tons of oil. 
 
3.6. The Fund 
As we have mentioned before, since it was realized at the 1969 Conference that the 
1969 CLC could not offer a satisfactory solution to provide adequate compensation 
for oil pollution victims, the idea of an international compensation fund was proposed 
as a compromise to solve the unresolved dispute. The 1971 Fund Convention was 
designed on the one hand to provide additional compensation to the pollution victims, 
and to relieve the ship-owner and its insurer from the heavy financial burden imposed 
on them through the 1969 CLC.  
 
The 1971 Fund Convention has substantially increased the compensation amount 
available to the oil pollution victims to the aggregate amount  of 450 million francs.49 
This was increased in the 1992 Fund Convention to 135 million SDR. And again the 
amount was further increased to 750 million SDR under the 2000 Fund Protocol. 
 
However, dissatisfied with the international solution and suffering from one after 
another major oil spills, the European Union decided to take some regional action. In 
reaction to the Erika incident, the European Commission has adopted two sets of 
legislative proposals in March and December 2000 respectively, the so-called Erika I 
package50 and Erika II package.51 In these two packages, the Commission condemned 
the international compensation system as set up by the CLC and the Fund Convention 
to be ineffective. According to the European Commission, the international system 
could not provide adequate compensation due to existence of the limitation of liability 
                                           
49 Article 4 (4) of the 1971 Fund Convention. Article 4 (6) of the 1971 Fund Convention provides that 
the Assembly of the Fund may decide to increase the amount to 900 million francs, taking into account 
the experience of incidents and the damage therefrom and the changes of monetary value. 
50 COM (2000) 142 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Safety of the Seaborne Oil Trading, 21 March 2000. 
51 COM (2000) 802 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on a Second Set of Community Measures on Maritime Safety following the Sinking of the Oil 
Tanker Erika, 6 December 2000. 
30 
 
 
 
 
and did not have a sufficient deterrent effect. In the Erika II package, the Commission 
even proposed to set up a European compensation Fund (the Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution in European waters, known as the COPE Fund) with an updated 
ceiling of €1 billion (instead of €200 million under the 1992 conventions).52 However, 
the Council preferred to delivered the issue to the IMO as they considered that such 
international problem could be better tackled at international level.  
 
As a result of the efforts of the EU, the IMO has adopted in 2003 a Protocol to 
establish a Supplementary Fund, which provides compensation up to the amount as 
proposed by the EU. The Supplementary Fund Protocol came into force on 3 March 
2005 when the requirement of 8 joining Member States and 450 million tones of 
contributing oil was fulfilled. Lots of people are very optimistic about the impact of 
the Supplementary Fund.53 However, so far the assessment of the impact of the 
Supplementary Fund is purely theoretical, and it will not be fully realized until there is 
an oil spill which is on a large enough scale to bring it into play. 
 
It should be mentioned that the contribution of the 1992 Fund is levied on those who 
receive in a calendar year more than 150,000 tonnes of “contributing oil” (including 
crude oil and fule oil) in a port or terminal in the territory of a Member State after sea 
transport. The amount of the contribution of a specific oil receiver is directly related 
to the quantity of oil he has received in a calendar year. The 1992 Fund Convention 
also has a provision in Article 36 ter that the aggregate amount of the annual 
contributions from one single State shall not exceed 27.5% of the total amount of 
annual contributions. Otherwise, the contributions of all contributors in that State shall 
be reduced pro rata until their aggregate contribution equals 27.5%, and accordingly, 
                                           
52 See in this respect the amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Establishment of a Fund for the Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage in European 
Waters and Related Measures, OJ C227 E/487 of 24 September 2002. 
53 According to the Director of the 1992 Fund, Mr. Måns Jacobsson , the amount available under the 
Supplementary Fund could ensure “in practically all cases” that it would be possible from the outset to 
pay compensation for claims in States Parties at 100% of the amount of the damage. The Secretary - 
General of the IMO Mr. William O’Neil had the same view that the goal of full compensation of oil 
pollution victims can be reached through the establishment of this Supplementary Fund. See Måns 
Jacobsson, “The International Compensation Regime 25 Years On”, The IOPC Funds’ 25 Years of 
Compensating Victims of Oil Pollution Incidents, London, The IOPC Funds, 2003, at p. 22, 32. 
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contributions from other States should be increased pro rata so as to ensure the total 
amount of contributions will reach the required amount of contributions. This 
reflected the concern that the function of the Fund should be ensured by the fair 
distribution of contribution around the world. 
 
3.7. Regulation 
So far we have only sketched the liability and compensation system on oil pollution. 
In fact, the IMO has developed other conventions concerning the prevention and 
safety regulation which functions ex ante. In this respect, there are the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 as amended by the 1978 
Protocol (MARPOL 73/78), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS Convention). There are indeed measures to be taken in advance which can 
prevent the occurrence of an oil spill. The design standard of ships, as demonstrated 
by the Erika and Prestige incidents (both are single-hull tankers), the double hull 
design can reduce the chance of an oil spill.  
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Note on the literature 
We will now examine to what extent the legal regime sketched in section 3 
corresponds to the economic principles which we have sketched in section 2. There 
are no papers that provide a traditional law and economic analysis of the CLC and 
fund regime as such. However, in the years following the implementation of the CLC 
(1969) and the Fund Convention (1971) various analysis have appeared in maritime 
law related journals like e.g. the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. 
Remarkably some of this literature refers to the then just starting economic analysis of 
law, e.g. by pointing at the relevance of the Coase theorem. This is for instance done 
32 
 
 
 
 
in a detailed study of the fund regime by Hunter54. In this early literature reference is 
also made to the fact that a liability regime should be put in place to make tanker 
owners pay for the social costs they cause55. Wood already made a reference to the 
fact that civil liability can have a preventive effect and should be used to internalize 
the social costs of marine oil transportation56. Also the issue whether oil pollution 
incidents should primarily be controlled via design criteria (regulation) or via civil 
liability was already discussed in this early literature57. A critical review of the 
financial limits on compensation is provided by Smets.58 
 
In addition there is an overwhelming literature on the economic effects of various 
enforcement strategies as far as oil pollution incidents is concerned, but the main 
focus of our paper is the civil liability regime and hence we will not focus on those59. 
 
4.2. Nature of the liability rule 
The CLC, both in its 1969 and its 1992 version impose a strictly liability rule for 
damage caused by oil pollution. In this respect our economic analysis can be brief: 
above we already indicated that the economic literature on accident law proposes a 
strict liability rule for these situations where the injurers on the accident risk is more 
                                           
54 Hunter, L.A.W., “The proposed international compensation fund for oil pollution damage”, Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1972, 117-139. 
55 See e.g. Bergman, S., “No fault liability for oil pollution damage”, Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, 1973, 1-50 and Goldie, L.F.E., “Liability for oil pollution disasters: international law and 
the limitation of competences in a federal policy”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 303-
329. 
56 Wood, L.D., “An integrated international and domestic approach to civil liability for vessel-source 
oil pollution”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 1-68. In that paper Wood equally 
analyses the economic effects of allocating liability to various parties involved in the transport of oil.  
57 Cummins, Ph.A. and others, “Oil tanker pollution control: design criteria vs. effective liability 
assessment”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 169-206 and Pedrick, J.L., “Tank ship 
design regulation and its economic effect on oil consumers”, Journal of maritime Law and Commerce, 
1978, 377-395. That paper discusses the economic (price) effects of design regulations on oil prices. 
58 Smets, H. “The oil spill risk: economic assessment and compensation limit”, Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, 1983, 23-43. That paper examines the financial consequences of various increases 
of the financial limits on liability. 
59 See for instance Cohen, N., “The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement”, Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 13, 1986, 167-188 and Faure, M. and Heine, G., 
“The insurance of fines: the case of oil pollution”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 1991, 
39-54. 
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important than the victims. This choice therefore seems to correspond with the 
economic literature. It is interesting to note that both during the preparation of the 
original CLC and in the early literature justifications for the strict liability were given 
that correspond largely with the economic reasoning. It was more particularly the 
French delegation that pushed strongly in favor of strict liability. It held that the 
liability should be fixed according to a “simple, efficient and economic system”60. 
Goldie equally argued that strict liability for catastrophic damage to third parties 
should be imposed since otherwise an enterprise might be able to shift social costs 
from the enterprise to society61 and Wood explicitly referred to the need to internalize 
the social costs of marine oil transportation as justification for the (strict) liability 
regime62: “Full liability for oil pollution damage is necessary to deter unnecessarily 
dangerous or negligent conduct and to encourage a socially optimal level of 
precautions for the petroleum industry”. 
 
Moreover it should be added that from Article III (2) of the CLC it follows that there 
is no liability for pollution damage in case of force majeure or in case of an 
intentional act of a third party. The exclusion of liability in case of force majeure of 
course makes sense since the economic analysis assumes that liability will provide 
incentives to increase the level of precaution. Hence, attaching liability also in the 
situation where the tanker owner could not influence the accident risk and could 
therefore not have affected his incentives does not make sense from an economic 
perspective.  
 
It is equally important to stress that Article III (3) of the CLC provides that if the 
pollution resulted wholly or partially from a (negligent or intentional) act or omission 
of the victim the tanker owner will be exonerated wholly or partially from liability. 
Hence, the required defence is added to the strict liability rule to provide the victim 
                                           
60 However, it was not only for deterrence reasons that strict liability was proposed. The French 
delegation equally argued that strict liability would be the only guarantee for an optimal compensation. 
See Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Documents LEG/CONF/C.2/SR3 – 13, IMO, 625 – 689. 
61 See Goldie, L.F.E., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 310. 
62 See Wood, L.D., Note 55, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 23-24. 
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incentives to take care as well. Also this corresponds with the economic principles 
sketched above. 
 
4.3. Limitation of liability 
In this respect we can equally be brief: the economic literature showed that a strict 
liability rule is efficient only if the potential injurer is fully exposed to the potential 
damage which may result from his activity. A financial limit on the (strict) liability of 
the tanker owner will have the same effect as the insolvency of the tanker owner: 
underdeterrence. The tanker owner will consider the accident only as one whole the 
limited amount of liability is the maximum damage that can be suffered and a 
corresponding (lower) level of preventive measures will be chosen. As such a 
financial cap on liability can therefore be considered inefficient, more particularly 
since it concerns here a situation where damage is suffered by third parties so that 
Coasean bargaining is not possible.  
 
A possible justification for the cap could be found in the situation where one would 
argue that the comparative negligence defence (just mentioned) would not provide 
adequate incentives to victims (more particularly the coastal states suffering the oil 
pollution damage). In that case one could argue that lower than full compensation for 
the victims may provide an additional incentives for victim care. However, given the 
fact that it is more important to control the injurers incentives than the victims and 
considering the fact that the CLC does provide for a comparative negligence defence 
there is no reason to assume that this defence can not adequately provide incentives 
for care to the victims of oil pollution damage. Moreover, the positive effects a cap 
may have on victims incentives would probably be totally countered by the negative 
effects this would have on the tanker owners incentives for prevention.  
 
The fact that, principally a financial limit on liability as contained in the CLC should 
be considered inefficient does, however, not necessarily mean that the cap will in 
practice also lead to a higher level of oil pollution incidents. First, for many (smaller) 
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oil pollution incidents the damage may well be lower than the limit of liability. The 
risk of underdeterrence may therefore only arrive in those (catastrophic) cases where 
the amount of the damage actually was higher than the cap. Second, the prevention of 
oil pollution incidents is today primarily dependent upon regulation aiming at an 
optimal tanker design to prevent spill risks. Liability rules therefore have at most an 
additional deterrent effect to back up this regulation. The fact that the cap may create 
underdeterrence can thus affect this additional incentive effect of the liability regime, 
but should not necessarily lead to an increase of pollution incidents. That will depend 
upon the effectiveness of the regulatory system and the extent to which liability rules 
thus have to provide supplementary incentives. 
 
The limitation of the liability was as a principle hardly discussed during the 1969 
conference preceding the CLC. Liability in maritime law had always been limited and 
therefore the principle was as such hardly discussed. The problem is of course that in 
traditional maritime law the limitation applies in the contractual context towards a 
charterer. In that case the limit does not pose a specific problem since the limit in 
liability can be compensated with a lower price for the transport and the charterer 
could seek protection through first party insurance. Although these arguments do not 
apply in the context of a liability towards third parties the principle of the limitation 
was hardly discussed. It was only mentioned (more particularly by the UK delegation) 
that a system of limitation of liability was justified by the mechanism of compulsory 
insurance63. That argument is, however, not very convincing since the duty to insure 
could have been limited to an (insurable) amount whereas the liability itself could 
have remained unlimited. Most of the discussions during the 1969 conference merely 
focussed on the amount of the limit, not on the principle as such. Remarkable in that 
respect was that this amount was fixed on the basis of the tonnage of the ship, but the 
question was hardly asked whether the limited amount of compensation available 
would be sufficient to cover the actual costs of a (major) pollution incident64. 
                                           
63 See Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/4, IMO,  487. 
64 Only the US delegation argued that the limit should be fixed in such a way that substantially all 
losses would be covered. See Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine 
Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/4, IMO, 489. 
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Especially interesting is the empirical study of Smets who analyzed in 1983 what the 
effects would be of an increase of the available amount of compensation by 
$250.000.000 (compared to the $ 52.000.000 available at that time).65 Smets argues 
that the economic effects of such an increase would be limited as large oil spills are 
rare events compared with the total number of oil spills. He calculated that the 
economic impact of the mentioned increase would be less than $0.055 per ton 
transported and would thus, in other words, be insignificant.  
 
4.4.  Channeling of liability 
As the description of the conventions made clear the liability in the CLC is 
“channeled” to the tanker owner. In addition Article III (4) provides that no claim for 
compensation for pollution damage may be made against the owner otherwise than in 
accordance with the convention and that no claim may be made against any other 
person than the tanker owner. As was indicated in the economic sketch in section 2, 
this seems inefficient since many other parties than the tanker owner may also 
influence the pollution risk. Although the tanker owner may of course be the one who 
can primarily take safety measures to prevent oil pollution, also other parties can 
influence the risk and their incentives should hence be influenced by a liability rule as 
well. This choice, more particularly between a liability on primarily the tanker owner 
or on the cargo interests was also extensively discussed during the 1969 conference 
and in the early literature. For instance the German delegation argued that it is the 
operator who uses the ship for his own account and who can ensure that the ship is 
properly equipped and managed66. The argument was equally made by the UK 
delegation that the cargo owner could exercise no control over the cargo while it was 
on the high seas and that the carrier would be the only one who ad the capacity to 
prevent an incident on high seas67. But whereas all these arguments show that at least 
the tanker owner should be made liable others equally argued that other parties, like 
                                           
65 Smets, H., Note 57, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1983, 31-43. 
66 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR3, IMO, 627. 
67 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR3, IMO, 638. 
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e.g. the cargo owners could take preventive measures as well. Indeed, it may be clear 
that if liability for pollution damage where imposed on other parties like e.g. a cargo 
owner this could provide incentives to choose safer ships in order to avoid pollution 
incidents. In a 1975 paper Wood argued that the US should not follow this example of 
the CLC in its domestic liability regime since liability should rest upon each party 
who could take significant precautions to prevent polluting discharges of oil.68 He 
argues: liability to discourage negligence and reward ship-owners would be poorly 
served by placing all liability upon registered ship-owners, since they rarely have 
significant control over the operation, manning or navigation of oil tankers. Instead, 
the typical registered owner is a “straw man” corporation in a “flag-of-convenience” 
nation. Ship-owners often surrender all control of their vessels to bareboat or demise 
charterers, which are often subsidiaries of the oil companies for which most tankers 
are in fact constructed”. 
 
The decision in the CLC to exclude liability of all other persons than the tanker owner 
who could have influenced the accident risk does therefore not seem not to be in line 
with economic insights. The underdeterrence of those parties is, however, still 
mitigated in at least two ways. First Article III (5) provides that the convention does 
not prejudice any right of recourse of the owner against third parties. One can, 
however, doubt that tanker owners will often exercise this right of recourse, so that 
one should not expect to much of an additional deterrency of this possibility of a right 
of recourse. Second, at least one of the other parties, being the oil receivers, at least in 
some way contribute to the costs of oil pollution incidents, since they finance the 
international oil pollution compensation fund. However, this only applies to the oil 
receivers and moreover, there are serious doubts as to whether the financing structure 
of the fund provides adequate incentives for prevention.  
 
Interestingly enough the early literature at the 1969 conference also made a reference 
to the fact that a tanker owner who would face increased liability could also pass on 
the costs of this additional liability to the oil companies and eventually to the end 
                                           
68 Wood, .D., Note 55, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 40. 
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users. If this presumption (referring to the application of the Coase theorem) were met 
one could argue that the problem of underdeterrence caused by excluding the liability 
of the charterers should not be that large. Indeed, if charterers where confronted with 
increased transportation costs as a result liabilities imposed upon the tanker owner 
they would in turn claim safer ships as well.69 For instance at the 1969 conference the 
Netherlands delegation argued that even though the insurance liability rested with the 
carrier, it would be transferred to the cargo in the form of increasing freight70. This 
implicit reference to the Coase theorem can also be found in the literature where it is 
mentioned that oil companies are of course the most efficient in distributing oil 
production costs71. It was equally argued that the increased liability would (partially) 
be passed on to the end users, even though the added costs were at the time of the 
1969 conference only estimated at 0,04%72. However, oil companies would, so it was 
argued, probably not pass on the increment in costs entirely to the end users and 
would absorb part of it with a decrease in profits73.  
 
In addition the point was also made, both at the 1969 conference and in the early 
literature that one could wonder whether the exclusion of liability of the tanker owner 
would make such a big difference since many major oil companies are of course both 
tanker owners and cargo owners74. This may be true for the oil companies which 
indeed have their own tanker fleet75. But there are of course also oil companies that 
use tankers with which they have no ties at all. (These types of tankers are owned by 
                                           
69 Remind, however, that this argument may only apply to those parties to which the tanker owner can 
effectively pass on the costs. However, Article III (4) of the CLC mentions a number of other parties 
that could influence the accident risk with which the tanker owner does not necessarily stand in a 
contractual relationship and who’s liability is also excluded (see e.g. Article III (4) (e): “any person 
taking preventive measures”). 
70 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR3, IMO, 643. This point was also made by Lord Devlin in his report to 
the International Maritime Consultative Organization in 1967. 
71 Hunter, L.A.W., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1972, 130.  
72 More particularly by the Canadian delegation (see Official Records of the International Legal 
Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR4, IMO, 633). 
73 This optimistic view was held by Bergman, S., “No-fault liability for oil pollution damage”, Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1973, 44, referring to the strong market power of oil companies. 
74 Hunter, L.A.W., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1972, 130. 
75 Today around 25% of the tanker fleet is owned by oil companies, while around 75% is owned by 
independent tanker owners. Statistics from INTERTANKO, Swift, P., Oil Shipping Today, 8 March 
2005. 
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independent owners.) Hence the question still arises why at the 1969 conference so 
much attention was paid to allocating liability either to the tanker owner or to the 
cargo and whether the exclusion of liability of the cargo owner is indeed that dramatic 
if increased liabilities could indeed be passed on without costs. The answer is 
probably that the zero transaction cost assumption of the Coasean bargaining setting is 
not met in all circumstances in the case of a transport of oil. Legal and practical 
restrictions may inhibit the passing on of the increased liability to the cargo interests. 
Moreover, in a law suit the victim may be confronted with the solvency boundaries of 
the tanker owner and his insurer. Given the fact that this liability is limited and that an 
additional suit against other liable parties like a charterer are prohibited by the CLC 
the underdeterrence caused by channeling remains. In sum: it can not be argued that 
since increased liabilities of the tanker owner can simply be passed on to the charterer 
there would be no negative effect at all of the exclusion of liability of other parties 
than the tanker owner. 
 
A final argument in favor of the channeling of liability to the tanker owner which was 
also advanced referred to the fact that the tanker owner could more easily obtain 
insurance coverage than other parties. However, that argument was rightly rejected in 
the literature as well: each of the other parties who influence the risk of oil pollution 
incident could easily purchase liability insurance coverage as well. “Insurance rates 
should reflect the likelihood of a liability-inducing oil discharge and should reward 
safety measures with lower premiums”76. Also the insurance argument can therefore 
hardly provide any justification for the channeling of liability which results in an 
inefficient exclusion of other parties than the tanker owner who could also influence 
the risk. 
 
4.5. Compulsory insurance 
It is not difficult to argue that the introduction of a duty on the liable tanker owner to 
seek financial coverage to meet his obligations fits into the economic framework. The 
                                           
76 So Wood, L.D., Note 55, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 40. 
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CLC was wise enough to stipulate that the financial security should not necessarily be 
provided through insurance. Article VII (1) refers explicitly to “insurance or other 
financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank or a certificate delivered by an 
international compensation fund”. Indeed, insurance is only one of the ways in which 
the tanker owner could provide security that he could meet his liabilities.  
 
Although during the 1969 conference the main reason which was advanced as 
justification for the introduction of compulsory insurance was victim compensation, 
from an economic perspective compulsory insurance is, as was indicated above, 
especially important as a remedy caused by underdeterrence as a result of insolvency. 
Of course criticism could be formulated with respect to the way in which the 
obligation was formulated. This refers e.g. to the fact that the compulsory insurance 
only applies to tankers carrying more than 2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo, whereas 
also smaller ships could cause large pollution and face insolvency problems77. 
Another issue is that during the 1969 conference it was proposed to give the 
contracting state the right to refuse access to the port where ships could not produce 
the required certificate, proving the availability of insurance78. The convention in its 
original formulation merely provided that states would “ensure” that a ship would 
only be allowed if it could provide a certificate, which may of course create 
enforcement problems79. 
 
In the literature criticism has been formulated with respect to the practical working of 
the insurance, more particularly as it is provided through the Protection and Indemnity 
Clubs (P&I Clubs) of the ship-owners. Criticism has more particularly been 
formulated with respect to the fact that an international agreement between the P&I 
Clubs has been formulated which restricts competition80. The European Commission 
                                           
77 See the discussions in this respect at the conference, Official Records of the International Legal 
Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR14, IMO, 708-709. 
78 This was more particularly proposed by France, see Official Records of the International Legal 
Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/4, IMO, 468. 
79 In the current version of Article VII (10) it is provided that a contracting state “shall not permit a 
ship” “unless a certificate has been issued” which proves the coverage of the liability. 
80 See Faure, M. and Van den Bergh, R., “Restrictions of competition on insurance markets and the 
applicability of EC and anti-trust law”, Kyklos, 1995, 65-85. 
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has moreover granted an exemption from the old cartel Article 85 (3) of the EEC 
treaty on 16 December 1985 for this international agreement81. In a report of 12 May 
1999 of the European Commission concerning regulation nr. 3932/9282 the 
Commission once more holds that a cooperation between the P&I Clubs is necessary 
to provide the required coverage (even though the Commission equally states that all 
P&I Clubs together have a world wide market share of 89% on the market for marine 
insurance)83. This exclusion of competition always creates the danger of too high 
premiums, too little product differentiation and a too low supply for coverage84. Of 
course one may argue that since it are the ship-owners themselves that largely 
constitute the P&I Clubs the consequences of the restricted competition should not be 
that dramatic since no one would after all be victimized. That is, however, not entirely 
true. Firs of all, there are many shipping lines that do not participate in the P&I Clubs 
and hence will have to seek maritime insurance coverage through the Clubs. Second, 
the restrictions on competition may, within the context of oil pollution damage also 
lead to a too limited supply of insurance coverage for pollution damage, which may 
thus harm the interests of third parties. Another consequence of too little competition 
between the P&I clubs may be that there incentives for an effective monitoring may 
be reduced. Thus the efforts of P&I clubs to monitor oil discharge may be 
suboptimal85. 
 
4.6. Compensation fund. 
In our brief economic sketch in section 2 we showed that whenever an alternative 
compensation mechanism like a fund is installed, in principle a risk and premium 
differentiation should be applied as well in order to provide optimal incentives for 
                                           
81 For a criticism on this exemption see Faure, M. and Van den Bergh, R., Objectieve 
aansprakelijkheid, verplichte verzekering en veiligheidsregulering, Antwerp, Maklu 1989, 331-336. 
82 Com (1999) 192 final of 12 May 1999. 
83 Report, nr. 29. 
84 For details see Faure, M. and Van den Bergh, R., “Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering, concurrentie en 
ongevallenpreventie”in Hartlief, T. and Mendel, M.N. (eds), Verzekering en Maatschappij, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2000, 315-342. 
85 See Faure, M. and Heine, G., “The insurance of fines: the case of oil pollution’, The Geneva Papers 
on Risk and Insurance, 1991, 49-50. 
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prevention. One can question whether the financing structure of the current 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund corresponds with these principles. 
Indeed, as we have shown above the fund is financed by levies on the oil transported, 
to be paid by the oil receivers. An interesting point is that as a result of this financing 
of the fund by the oil interests the compensation regime consists on the one hand of 
the (limited) liability of the tanker owner supplemented with a fund which is financed 
by the oil receivers. At the 1969 conference it was, moreover, made clear that only 
because part of the compensation would be provided through the oil interests via the 
fund the liability of the tanker owners was considered acceptable86. If this would 
mean that as a result of this the oil interests would receive incentives for preventing 
oil incidents some of the downsides of the channeling could be undone. However, 
given the financing structure of the fund one can doubt whether this actually provides 
for incentives for prevention to the oil interests. Indeed, their financial burden towards 
the fund is merely determined on the basis of the amount of oil discharged, not on the 
basis of preventive measures taken or actual oil pollution incidents. Hence, the oil 
receivers are not rewarded e.g. for choosing safer ships or punished (with a higher 
contribution) for choosing riskier ones. Their contribution to the fund merely varies 
with the amount of oil transported. In terms of the economic analysis of section 2 one 
can argue that the financing structure merely provides incentives to the oil industry for 
reducing the activity level (transporting less oil) but not for an efficient level of care. 
Moreover, the legal analysis made clear that the fund (in the normal case) only 
intervenes for the amount which is not covered by the limited liability of the tanker 
owner87 which is of course a small part of the total costs of an oil pollution incident. It 
was held during the conference to prepare the fund that only 5% of large scale oil 
casualties could not be dealt with under the existing rules88. This means that the oil 
interests would effectively only intervene for a relatively small part of the oil 
                                           
86 See the comments made at the 1969 Conference by various delegates in Official Records of the 
International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, Document LEG/CONF/3, IMO, 2-
11.  
87 An exception constitutes the case where the tanker owner would be insolvent. In that case the fund 
would de facto act as a guarantor towards the victim. 
88 Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 1969, 
Document LEG/CONF/C.2/SR12, IMO, 685-686. 
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pollution incidents, al be it that the incidents where the fund intervenes can of course 
usually be considered as catastrophic.  
 
Interestingly enough already the early literature from just after the drafting of the 
1971 Fund Convention formulated similar serious criticism on the fund. Already in 
1972 in a critical paper Hunter held that precisely for the reasons mentioned above the 
fund would not play a meaningful role in the preventive aspect of oil pollution 
problems89. The 1971 version of the Fund Convention moreover had a curious rule in 
Article 5, which provided that the fund would indemnify a ship-owner for certain 
amounts the ship-owner would have paid to third parties. Thus the 1971 fund also had 
a so-called “ship-owner indemnity” function. There the literature of course held that 
this reduction of the ship-owner’s liability through the fund will reduce his motivation 
to avoid oil discharges proportionally90. In the 1992 version of the Fund Convention 
this disputed Article 5 has been deleted.  
 
In sum: if compensation of oil pollution damage is set as a policy goal and it appears 
that traditional insurance markets (or pooling through P&I clubs) can not provide 
more or less full compensation, alternatives will have to be developed through (public 
or private) compensation funds. However, economic literature has generally held that 
also in structuring such a compensation fund a cost reduction should be achieved and 
the contribution to the compensation mechanisms should in principle be laid on those 
that create the risk and in the proportion in which they create the risk. It seems that 
these principles are only to a small extent followed in the design of the Fund 
Convention. The drafters apparently attached more importance to balancing the 
contribution of tanker owners and cargo interests instead of designing a system that 
would provide optimal incentives for the prevention of oil spills by all those who 
created those risks. 
 
                                           
89 See Hunter, L.A.W., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1972, 127-137. Compare Cummins, 
Ph.A. and others, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 174-177, where it is equally argued 
that a public compensation scheme for oil pollution damage should be based on premiums which are 
related to expected damages in order to provide incentives to prevent oil spills. 
90 See Wood, L.D., Note 55, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 58.  
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4.7. Regulation. 
It is, given Shavell’s criteria for safety regulation, no surprise that increasingly the 
risk of pollution incidents is controlled through regulation aiming at the design of 
tankers in such a way that pollution incidents can be prevented. The phasing out of 
single hull tankers, state inspections by port states and controls by classification 
societies are just some of the regulations that have received increasing attention in 
recent years. Of course increased safety designs will lead to (a small) increase in oil 
prices, which has been calculated in various empirical studies91. This is of course not 
the place to discuss the efficiency and effectiveness of these tanker design 
regulations92. More interesting is the question whether in addition to this regulation, 
any additional deterrent effect can be expected from liability rules. It is, lacking 
empirical evidence, not possible to provide hard data on the effectiveness of liability 
rules in supplementing safety regulation. There are, however, some indications in the 
literature. For instance Wood argues that “civil liability can also serve a prophylactic 
function. A properly structured system for civil liability would exert a powerful 
influence to discourage polluting discharges of oil”93. Cummins et al examine 
explicitly the effectiveness of liability versus regulation in oil tanker pollution 
control.94 They argue strongly in favor of liability rules and against regulation, 
arguing that a liability for major oil spills would leave it up to the tanker owner to 
choose the least cost method of pollution control in case of oil spills95. They conclude 
that imposing design standards might inhibit innovation and would be much too rigid 
compared to a liability system96. Of course one could rebut to these authors that 30 
years of experience after they published their paper showed that apparently the 
liability regime has not been able to prevent major oil spills like with the Erika or the 
Prestige. However, this would hardly be fair given the fact that we precisely indicated 
that the liability system as it was installed in the 1969 CLC of course did not provide 
                                           
91 For an early one see Pedrick, J.L., “Tank ship design regulation and its economic effect on oil 
consumers”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1978, 377-395. 
92 For an overview of developments in this respect at the EU level see Wang, H., “The EU marine oil 
pollution regime – recent developments”, European Environmental Law Review, 2004, 292-303. 
93 Wood, L.D., Note 55, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 2. 
94 Cummins, Ph.A. a.o., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 169-206.  
95 Cummins, Ph.A., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 175.  
96 Cummins, Ph.A., Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1975, 204-206.  
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adequate incentives, given the channeling and the low limits on the liability of the 
tanker owner. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we used the traditional economic analysis of accident law to analyse the 
legal regime with respect to the compensation for oil pollution damage. We first 
sketched in section 2 how an optimal regime could look like from an economic 
perspective. The main features from this theoretical analysis were that a strict liability 
rule should be imposed, but that a (comparative or contributory negligence) defence 
should be added to account for the victim’s influence on the accident risk. Moreover 
to cope with the insolvency risk the liability of the parties involved should be covered 
through some kind of financial security. Moreover it was held that in principle all 
those who can influence the oil pollution risk should be exposed to liability and in 
principle to the full amount. If, moreover, alternative compensation mechanisms were 
to be installed the financing of those should in principle mimic the insurance market, 
i.e. risk differentiation should be applied to provide optimal incentives for risk 
reduction.  
 
The confrontation of the legal regime (described in section 3) with these rather 
straightforward conclusions from the economic analysis took place in section 4. We 
found that to a large extent the international oil pollution regime follows the 
predictions from the economic model (e.g. as far as the imposition of a strict liability 
rule and adding a comparative negligence defence is concerned). The major 
deviations found relate to the fact that the financial liability is channeled to the tanker 
owner, excluding the liability of others who could have contributed to the risk. 
Moreover this liability is financially limited with a so-called cap. Additional 
compensation is provided through a fund, financed by the oil interests. The financing 
structure, however, is only to a limited extent risk related.  
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Interestingly enough we noticed that many of the economic arguments were also 
(often implicitly) presented at the 1969 Conference which prepared the CLC and also 
in early literature published in maritime law journals shortly after the adoption of the 
CLC and Fund Convention. The difference between these early papers (most of these 
date from more than 30 years now) and our analysis is that we of course could take 
into account more recent law and economics literature (like the many publications of 
Shavell on accident law) and that we could address the international oil pollution 
compensation regime in a more integrated manner. Moreover, we could also have a 
look at the evolution of the international oil pollution compensation regime since the 
set up in 1969-1971. In fact recent evolutions only reinforce some of the early 
analysis in which inter alia criticism was formulated on the channeling and on the 
financial limits. Indeed, every new pollution incident with every time higher damage 
made an adaptation of the convention limits necessary. The result has been a cascade 
of protocols and amendments97. It even led to a threat of a European Commissions 
initiative to set up a compensation fund for oil pollution damage for Europe, separate 
from the international regime. Under this threat the amounts in the Fund Convention 
were in May 2003 again increased so that the total amount of compensation available 
now totals approximately one billion US dollar.98 All these evolutions make clear that 
the idea itself of limiting liability should probably be critically reassessed. This is 
obviously the case for the channeling as well, since this leads to the non-liability of 
many who could contribute to the oil pollution risk.  
 
If one would therefore like to draw normative conclusions at the policy level from this 
analysis they seem relatively straightforward: abolish the financial limits and the 
channeling of liability and restructure the fund so that contributions are more risk 
related. To a large extent these recommendations are implemented already today. The 
                                           
97 See Faure, M. and Wang, H., “The international regimes for the compensation of oil-pollution 
damage: are they effective?”, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(RECIEL). Vol. 12, 2003, 242-253. 
98 For an overview see Faure, M. and Wang, H., “Liability for oil pollution-the EU approach”, 
Environmental liability, 2004, 55-67. 
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European Commission has, as we indicated, exercised serious influence on the 
phenomenon on financial caps as well as on the channeling of liability.99 
 
Of course one should always take in to account that every economic analysis has its 
limits. Although this paper focussed on the international oil pollution compensation 
regime, from an economic perspective the main goal of this regime should be the 
prevention of oil pollution incidents. In the policy reality prevention of course plays a 
role as well, but providing actual compensation to victims after an incident occurred is 
often a much hotter political issue. Moreover, many will argue that prevention should 
primarily be achieved through regulations, e.g. aiming at a better functioning of the 
classification societies, port state control and phasing out of single hull tankers. Still, 
the supplementary deterrent function of liability rules may, also in the context of oil 
pollution incidents, not be underestimated, as was clearly stated in the (early) 
literature. The fact that liability rules have apparently not been able to prevent major 
oil spill incidents can of course hardly be provided as evidence of a lacking deterrent 
function of liability rules generally. Given the channeling of liability and the low 
limits it is of course difficult for liability rules to exercise fully their desire desired 
preventive effect in the current legal context. 
 
Moreover, economic analysis of course mainly focuses on efficiency and less on 
distributional issues. The reason why a regime which would be preferred from an 
economic perspective is not introduced may well be due to distributional reasons. 
Smets for instance indicated that a problem with an increase in liability limits is that 
this increase will be borne by all countries but may only benefit one country each year 
which would be victim of a major oil spill. Moreover the risk of oil spills may vary 
from country to country and some countries may not be willing to invest additional 
public expenditure or face an increase in the cost of imported oil100. 
 
                                           
99  See Notes 49 and 50. In the so-called Erika I and II packages, the European Commission criticized 
particularly the existence of the limitation of liability and the channeling provision. 
100 See Sets, H., “The oil spill risk: economic assessment and compensation limit”, Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, 1983, 35-43. 
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Also, our analysis limited itself to a public interest perspective of the international oil 
pollution compensation regime. It may, however, be clear that the parties involved do 
not only strive to serve the public interest, but (mainly) their private interests. The 
1969-1971 CLC-Fund regime was clearly the result of a workable balance between 
the competing interests. The ship owning states of course defended different interests 
than coastal states which could be victimized by oil pollution and had less of a 
shipping interest. Hence, from a public choice perspective the international oil 
pollution regime (and some of the inefficiencies we discovered, like financial caps) 
could well be the result of a competition between different interest groups101.  
 
Finally it would of course be desirable if theoretical economic analysis like the one 
presented in this paper could be backed up by solid empirical evidence. The problem 
is, however, that basic information, e.g. on the number of oil incidents per year and 
the damage suffered are basically lacking or at least not publicly available. This 
makes it therefore very difficult to test whether e.g. changes in the regulation or the 
liability regime do also have a positive impact on the number of incidents. It may be 
hoped that the responsible organizations will in the future cooperate to make these 
data available so that effectiveness studies can be performed as well. This could then 
in turn lead to a further improvement of the legal regime. 
                                           
101 See Becker, G., “A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1983, 371-400. 
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